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CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION*
James Win. Moore**
W e are in an era of upheaval and strife.
Unfortunate as the international tensions may be, it is
gratifying that we as a Nation present a united front to the ag-
gressors; and that the dissension among ourselves is domestic
and minor in character. Minor in character, because we are
essentially a people of good will committed to a rule of law. I do
not want to minimize the serious conflicts that divide some of
us, and which the communication media so stridently proclaim.
But there is no basis for despair nor alarm. There has been con-
flict within our Nation from its inception, and conflict will
continue, although I should hope and trust that the more seamy
aspects of current conflict will abate and disappear.
Rational and ordered conflict within the rule of law is a
healthy sign of a federal government such as ours. For if the
national government becomes all powerful, we shall end with a
monolithic system. On the other hand, if the states become all
powerful, we shall end with chaos far more confounded than that
endured as this people were struggling through the Revolution
and toward the creation of a national government. The problem
is one of rational adjustment.
I propose to discuss one aspect of this problem - the matter
of conflict between the federal and state judicial systems. While
the discussion will be technical I believe it mirrors broader prin-
ciples that far transcend technicalities.
Some of my students, sensing the great power exercised by
the federal courts today and hearing so much of federal rules and
federal jurisdiction, tend to ignore the state courts until re-
minded, not always gently, that state courts antedated the fed-
eral courts; were powerful before there were federal courts; and
have a very important role to play today.
I ask you to go back with me in history to pre-Constitution
days when faltering steps toward a federalism, that included a
*An address delivered at Louisiana State University Law School, November
28, 1962.
**Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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national judicial system, were being taken. A few pages of his-
tory will reveal deficiencies that have, in general, been remedied.
The beginnings of a federal court system may be seen in the
development of American courts of admiralty. Prior to the Rev-
olution, the colonial governors were usually commissioned vice-
admirals; and they or a specially appointed judge held vice-ad-
miralty courts, with jurisdiction, among other matters, over
cases of prize and capture. Following the commencement of the
Revolution the vice-admiralty courts came to an end, and the
Congress filled the void by asking the states to set up admiralty
courts for the trial of rights of capture, with final appeal to Con-
gress. Appeals were heard in Congress at first by ad hoc com-
mittees, later by a standing committee. While originally the
states readily allowed appeals to Congress, as time went on, they
attempted to restrict this right. Finally, the system proved un-
workable when, in a case involving the sloop Active, Pennsyl-
vania refused to follow the mandate of the committee, and the
committee stopped hearing appeals. Parenthetically, I want to
discuss the sloop Active case in a few moments.
Subsequently in 1780 Congress established the "Court of Ap-
peals in Prize Cases," while the Articles of Confederation were
in the process of ratification. The court was set up as an inde-
pendent judicial body; but after debating the issue, Congress
again denied it necessary powers of enforcement, and the court
had to look to state courts for enforcement of its decrees.
Under Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, Congress
was given power of "appointing courts for the trial of piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas and establishing courts
for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of cap-
tures." And, under this Article, Congress was to be the last re-
sort on appeal, by petition of the executive or legislative author-
ity of a state, in boundary disputes between states; and in pri-
vate disputes, where title to land was claimed under different
grants from two or more states, which originated prior to the
adjustment of the states' boundaries by Congress.
The federal Court of Appeals in Prize Cases continued after
the ratification of the Articles of Confederation. But jurisdic-
tion that had been granted under Article IX in cases of piracies
and felonies on the high seas was delegated to special courts com-
posed of state admiralty or superior court judges. The power
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of Congress under the Articles to act as an arbitral body on ap-
peal from a state executive or legislative authority in cases af-
fecting the boundaries between states, or grants of the same land
by two or more states, was exercised in a few instances, only one
of which actually came to trial. However, this case probably
averted further war between Pennsylvania and Connecticut fol-
lowing a few battles between the forces of those states.
The central failure of the system of appeals under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation was that this system depended for its
enforcement on the courts and officers of the very states whose
judgments were reversed. And, in areas where there was no fed-
eral appellate jurisdiction, Congress looked futilely to state
courts for enforcement of what were essentially national inter-
ests, and which were often antagonistic to the states.
We turn now from pre-Constitution days to the federal sys-
tem created by the Constitution. As the judicial system under
the Confederacy had proved futile and ineffective, lessons
learned from that system stilled dispute as to whether there
should be a supreme court of the United States. Such a national
court, with power to expound and act as final arbiter of a na-
tional Constitution, treaties made, or laws enacted thereunder is
an imperative necessity, if the federal government created by
the Constitution is to be an effective, national government. This
is certainly true when the national Constitution contemplates, as
does ours, (1) a division of power between the federal govern-
ment on the one hand and state governments on the other; (2)
that the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof and
treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be
the supreme law of the land; and (3) that there be a separation
of federal power among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches.
And so we find that the Constitution itself created a Supreme
Court of the United States. The Judiciary Article, Article III,
which enumerates the cases and controversies embraced within
the judicial power of the United States, created the Supreme
Court, although leaving its organization to Congress; and vested
the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over certain cases,
embraced within the federal judicial power, and with appellate
jurisdiction over all the other cases, "with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." Thus the
Constitution provided, and Congress by the first Judiciary Act
1962]
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of 1789 organized, a national supreme court with power to speak
with finality in construing the Constitution and laws and treaties
made in pursuance thereof. While the power of judicial review
over federal legislation, which was early established (and wisely,
it would seem) by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,' is not essen-
tial to a strong national government, there must be some power
in the national government to vindicate federal supremacy over
state legislation and state courts. And, as to judicial matters, it
was also early established that that power is committed to the
Supreme Court of the United States -Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee.
2
The framers of the Constitution were, however, in disagree-
ment as to whether there should be any inferior federal courts.
Under the Randolph proposal lower federal courts were also to
be established by the Constitution, but under the competing
Patterson plan there were to be no inferior courts and litigation
at the trial level was to be left to the state courts. The com-
promise adopted was to give Congress the constitutional option
to establish inferior federal courts. Thus Article III creates no
inferior federal courts; and vests such courts, when created by
Congress, with no jurisdiction. The enumeration in Section 2 of
Article III of the cases and controversies to which the federal
judicial power extends is not self-executing in relation to the
inferior federal courts. Congress cannot confer upon the inferior
federal courts jurisdiction over cases and controversies unless
they are within the judicial power of the United States. But
within the permissible limits stated in the Constitution it can
confer some or all of the judicial power upon the inferior federal
courts, and attach conditions and limitations to the jurisdictional
grant.
Congress exercised its authority to create inferior federal
courts at its first session when it enacted the Judiciary Act of
1789. And we have since had lower federal courts with their
jurisdiction expanded at times, restricted at other times, depend-
ing upon congressional will. Had there been no constitutional
power to create inferior federal courts, our Nation today would
be quite different. The federal government would then have been
dependent upon state courts to enforce federal rights. And al-
though the state courts are duty bound to enforce federal rights,
duty and effective enforcement of rights can be quite different
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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things, depending to a considerable degree on whether or not
the state court is sympathetic to the federal right. To be strong
a national government must have national courts that can be
expected to accord sympathetic and effective enforcement to fed-
eral rights. An illustration that comes readily to mind involves
the controversial subject of civil rights.
How do the inferior federal courts, such as the district courts
and courts of appeals, differ from state courts? The judges of
those federal courts have tenure during good behavior and their
compensation is not subject to diminution. The Constitution thus
assures them an independence which a great many states do not
assure their judges; and no state, I believe, gives an independ-
ence exceeding that accorded federal judges. If a federal judge
is not courageous he was born a coward.
The jurisdictional pendulum, on the other hand, favors the
state courts. The United States District Courts, while courts of
authority, are courts of limited jurisdiction; there is no presump-
tion in favor of their jurisdiction; and, so long as the case pends,
either in the trial or appellate courts, any party may raise lack of
federal jurisdiction, including the party who invoked the federal
court's jurisdiction, and the court-trial or appellate- may
raise want of jurisdiction on its own motion. Sometimes these
principles are destructively applied; and judicial administration
becomes bankrupt in that case. All this is done, so the boys from
the Charles River say, to keep the foundations of the Republic
from crumbling.
On the other hand, within each state is a baseline set of trial
courts of general jurisdiction; there is a presumption in favor of
their common law and/or equitable subject matter jurisdiction;
and the party who would challenge this must point out some valid
enactment, constitutional or legislative, that has withdrawn
jurisdiction over the case. Speaking of this in the Dred Scott
case, Chief Justice Taney stated:
"... they are presumed to have jurisdiction, unless the con-
trary appears. No averment in the pleadings of the plaintiff
is necessary, in order to give jurisdiction. If the defendant ob-
jects to it, he must plead it specially, and unless the fact on
which he relies is found to be true ... the jurisdiction cannot
be disputed in an appellate court."
3. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 401 (1856).
1962]
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In states other than Louisiana, which have the common law heri-
tage, state base line trial courts are successors to the equity
jurisdiction exercised by the English Court of Chancery and to
the common law jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Common
Pleas, King's Bench, and Court of Exchequer. Not only do the
state courts have the power to adjudicate state-created rights,
they have the power to adjudicate federal rights, unless Congress
has conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon a federal court or
courts. Even a case within the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction is subject to state court adjudication, unless Congress has
provided otherwise. This was ruled in Plaquemines Tropical
Fruit Co. v. Henderson,4 a case coming out of Louisiana, which
held that the Louisiana courts had jurisdiction of an action by
Louisiana against a citizen of New York although such a suit
was within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Indeed, where the federal courts do not have
exclusive jurisdiction, state courts are duty bound to enforce fed-
eral rights in a manner that does not discriminate against the
federal right.
Federal and state courts, then, are working partners, subject
to the supremacy of federal law as declared by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Two cases, one old, the other mod-
ern, point up these principles.
The first is the one mentioned earlier involving the sloop
Active; and its origins pre-date the Constitution. One Olmstead,
after he had been captured by the British and put aboard the
sloop Active, led a revolt of the crew and seized the sloop. But
before reaching port, the ship was seized by a brig belonging to
Pennsylvania. Taken into port, the sloop was claimed as a prize
by a privateer that had been cruising with the brig, by the state
of Pennsylvania, and by Olmstead and three others who had par-
ticipated in the revolt. The Pennsylvania state court awarded
Olmstead and his fellow claimants only one-fourth of the prize
and they appealed to Congress. Its Standing Committee on Ap-
peals reversed the state court and ordered the proceeds to be
turned over to the appellants. The state court refused, saying
that under the law of Pennsylvania the verdict of the jury was
final. Although the Committee had enjoined the state court
marshal from turning over the proceeds to the judge of the state
court, this was defied. Thereupon the Committee refused to
4. 170 U.S. 511 (1898).
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take further action "lest consequences might ensue at this junc-
ture dangerous to the public peace of the United States." Follow-
ing the adoption of the Constitution, litigation ensued in a
United States district court, and adjudication again went for
Olmstead. This time, however, the adjudication meant some-
thing. In holding that Olmstead was entitled to have his decree
enforced, Marshall stated in 1809:
"If the legislatures of the several states may, at will,
annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the con-
stitution itself becomes a solemn mockery; and the nation is
deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instru-
mentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a result must be
deprecated by all; and the people of Pennsylvania, not less
than the citizens of every other state, must feel a deep inter-
est in resisting principles so destructive of the Union, and in
averting consequences so fatal to themselves.
"The act in question does not, in terms, assert the univer-
sal right of the state to interpose in every case whatever; but
assigns, as a motive for its interposition in this particular
case, that the sentence, the execution of which it prohibits,
was rendered in a cause over which the federal courts have
no jurisdiction.
"If the ultimate right to determine the jurisdiction of the
courts of the Union is placed by the constitution in the sev-
eral state legislatures, then this act concludes the subject;
but if that power necessarily resides in the supreme judicial
tribunal of the nation, then the jurisdiction of the district
court of Pennsylvania, over the case in which that jurisdic-
tion was exercised, ought to be most deliberately examined;
and the act of Pennsylvania, with whatever respect it may be
considered, cannot be permitted to prejudice the question." 5
Subsequently the federal court's judgment and process were en-
forced by means of a large federal posse, sanctioned by President
Madison, against state troops called by the governor of Penn-
sylvania.
Marshall's language and the enforcement process strike a
current chord.
5. United States v. Judge Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809).
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The modern case, Testa v. Katt,6 decided in 1947, dealt de-
cisively with Rhode Island's attempt to secede from the Union
during World War II. I do not know whether your bayous would
swallow up Rhode Island. There are, however, canyons in my
native state of Montana where you could fling Rhode Island in
the fall and never find it until spring, when the chinooks had
melted away the winter snows. The Emergency Price Control
Act provided for actions to recover up to three times the amount
of a charge over the ceiling price, and conferred concurrent
jurisdiction on the federal, state, and territorial courts. Al-
though Rhode Island's courts had jurisdiction adequate and ap-
propriate for enforcement of the federal claim and the local
forum was not an inconvenient one, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the federal claim was not enforceable in the state
court since it involved "a penal statute in the international
sense" and a state need not enforce the penal statutes of a for-
eign sovereign.
In rejecting this thesis, Justice Black stated:
"For the purposes of this case, we assume, without de-
ciding, that [the Emergency Price Control Act] is a penal
statute in the 'public international,' 'private international,'
or any other sense. So far as the question of whether the
Rhode Island courts properly declined to try this action, it
makes no difference into which of these categories the Rhode
Island court chose to place the statute which Congress had
passed. For we cannot accept the basic premise on which the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that it has no more obliga-
tion to enforce a valid penal law of the United States than it
has to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign coun-
try. Such a broad assumption flies in the face of the fact that
the States of the Union constitute a nation. It disregards the
purposes of [the supremacy clause] Article VI, § 2 of the
Constitution.... -7
After reviewing the history of the principle that states have an
obligation, under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, to
enforce federal law, Justice Black continued:
"But after the fundamental issues over the extent of fed-
eral supremacy had been resolved by war, this Court took oc-
6. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
7. Id. at 389.
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casion in 1876 to review the phase of the controversy con-
cerning the relationship of state courts of the Federal Gov-
ernment. Claflin v. Houseman .... It repudiated the assump-
tion that federal laws can be considered by the states as
though they were laws emanating from a foreign sovereign.
Its teaching is that the Constitution and the laws passed pur-
suant to it are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike
upon states, courts, and people ... "
Thus the United States was spared the expense of sending an
ambassador to Rhode Island; Rhode Island was brought back
into the Union; and litigants could resort to Rhode Island courts
for the enforcement of federal rights.
The dual system of courts - federal and state - which we
have had since 1789 is rather unique. At best, some conflict is
bound to arise.
Time will permit only a resume of the sources of jurisdic-
tional conflict and principles designed to lessen or minimize the
conflict. On the whole the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party is of
such a character and the exercise of it has been such as not to
breed conflict between the federal and state judicial systems. In
fact, the exercise of its jurisdiction over cases between states,
and the United States and a state, is a rational substitute for
diplomacy or strife.
On the other hand, its appellate jurisdiction over state courts,
which it has had from the time of the original Judiciary Act of
1789, has caused more conflict. Although the validity of such
jurisdiction was hotly contested at one point in our Nation's his-
tory, it was sustained in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee9 and in
Cohens v. Virginia;"o and, at least since the War Between the
States, has not been doubted, as to all types of cases, civil and
criminal. At times, though, there is a tendency on the part of
some state courts to evade the Supreme Court's mandates.
Conflict, though there may be, is minimized by the principles
that the judgment be final, that it be rendered by the highest
court of the state in which a decision can be had, that the fed-
8. Id. at 390.
9. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
10. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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eral question must have been duly raised, and that there is no
jurisdiction to review a state court judgment resting on an ade-
quate non-federal ground.
Jurisdiction of the federal and state trial courts, some exclu-
sive, some concurrent, and the principle that two in personam
actions may both proceed produce conflict.
Diversity jurisdiction bred resentment in the past. The fed-
eral courts have had this jurisdiction since 1789, and thereby the
power to adjudicate state rights when the plaintiff is a citizen
of one state and the defendant a citizen of another state. Under
Swift v. Tyson," decided in 1842, the federal judge had a roving
commission to improve upon state substantive law as formulated
by the state decisional or common law. Naturally many people
resented this federal intrusion in a field in which the state was
presumably supreme. Rightly or wrongly, people often prefer
their own brand of cussedness to that imposed upon them by an
intruder. Erie-Tompkins12 changed this in 1938. While Erie-
Tompkins has produced many headaches for the federal courts,
I believe it has produced beneficial results by requiring the fed-
eral courts to apply state substantive law, substantially as the
state court would do, where no federal matter is involved. And
diversity jurisdiction now serves a useful function.
To some extent removal jurisdiction is an irritant, but main-
ly as to state criminal prosecutions and removal here is quite re-
stricted. And the Code of 1948 has eliminated some of the
sources of conflict of jurisdiction between the federal and state
court by providing that all petitions for removal are to be filed
with the federal district court, whereas before some petitions
were filed with this court and others with the state court.
Injunctive power is apt to be an irritant. In this area the
steady trend of federal legislation has been toward the delimita-
tion of the power of federal courts to interfere with state courts
and state action through the equitable writ of injunction. This
legislative development may be summarized as follows:
(1) Section 2283 of Title 28 of the United States Code,
which, subject to some exceptions, provides that a court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a state court;
11. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
12. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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(2) the statute providing for a three-judge district court,
and direct appeal to the Supreme Court, where an injunction is
sought to restrain the enforcement of a state statute or order of
a state administrative board or commission, upon the ground
that the statute or administrative order is contrary to the Fed-
eral Constitution and this federal claim is substantial;
(3) the Johnson Act of 1934, withdrawing federal jurisdic-
tion to interfere with state rate orders, not affecting interstate
commerce, where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy is avail-
able in the state courts; and
(4) the Act of August 21, 1937, withdrawing federal juris-
diction to restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of state
taxes where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy is available in
the state courts.
A parallel tendency to limit federal court interference with
state action may be traced in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
A facet of this is the Court's abstention doctrine, which usually
makes two law suits grow where only one grew before. This
Brobdingnagian approach can be very burdensome to litigants;
and, at times, has reached such debilitating bounds under Justice
Frankfurter's tutelage that it seems the Supreme Court spends
too much Harvardian time thinking up reasons why the federal
courts should do nothing.
In the field of federal habeas corpus, Section 2254, which is
largely declaratory of prior decisional law, requires an applicant
for habeas corpus, held in custody pursuant to a state judgment,
to exhaust his state remedies before petitioning the federal court.
This lessens the conflict between federal and state power; but
due to the present broad scope of the writ, exercise of the federal
power still remains a great irritant.
Americans, on the whole, are individualistic; and some are
rugged individuals. It is natural that some are rugged federal-
ists; while others are great champions of state rights. Many
may rationally believe the federal government intrudes too much
into local matters. Some laws and many legal principles are
bound to be unpopular at any given time with certain people. In
our federal system a clash between federal and state power may
reasonably be expected. Free and frank discussion of all laws
and decisions must remain open. The judiciary, no more than
the executive and legislative, is above criticism. But only orderly
19621
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processes - not force - are legitimate to change that which we
do not like. As stated earlier, conflict need not be feared so long
as it is confined within ordered bounds; is subject to the rule of
law; and the rule of law as declared by the Constitution, valid
federal statutes, and related principles are the supreme law of
the land.
These are principles which men and women of good will,
wherever they may be, may champion.
